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The case relates to an incident in 2023 involving PSI K Rangayya and Basavanagowda, a driver.

A bench of Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, in its order dated May 26, said, “The specific allegation is (Rangayya) directing the complainant that he should ‘do something for the other police officials’ or ‘make those boys happy’, constitutes a veiled demand for illegal gratification or undue advantage for these persons who were closely associated with him officially.”

Section 7(a) of the Act applies when the public servant himself obtains or accepts or attempts to obtain the undue advantage. Explanation 2(i) to Section 7 has enlarged the scope of the offence by not restricting the beneficiaries to the public servant himself only but to “another person” also.

Setting aside the Karnataka High Court order dated January 23, 2024, the Supreme Court bench said, “An attempt to obtain a bribe through subordinates, also public servants, is precisely the kind of indirect corruption that the legislature, by enacting Explanation 2 to Section 7, has sought to bring within the fold of the statute.”

On March 15, 2023, Rangayya allegedly seized Basavanagowda’s two-wheeler and his mobile phone on the grounds that he had been transporting rice meant for sale through fair price depots. Despite several requests to release the items, they were allegedly not returned.

The Supreme Court noted that this corroborated the causal nexus between the instructions and the subsequent demand made by his subordinate.

Basavanagowda then lodged a complaint with the Lokayukta police, based on which two raids were conducted and the constables were arrested.

The Lokayukta police argued that the high court had wrongly conducted a mini-trial at the First Information Report (FIR) stage, and the facts and circumstances of the present case disclose a strong prima facie case against Rangayya. Further, they said, the high court erroneously concluded that since Rangayya did not demand money for himself, the ingredient of demand was absent.

“If such an interpretation were to be upheld, it would create a dangerous loophole enabling senior officials to orchestrate the collection of illegal gratification through their subordinates while maintaining personal deniability, thereby defeating the very object and purpose of the Act,” the Lokayukta police argued.

Rangayya opposed the police appeal, claiming the present complaint was filed because there existed previous hostility between him and Basavanagowda. Further, on both occasions of raids, Rangayya said he was not present, and no recovery whatsoever was effected from him. Moreover, it was argued that Section 7(a) of the Act requires proof of both demand and acceptance, and in the present complaint, neither exists. “Mere vague or casual words cannot constitute demand under law,” Rangayya submitted.

Agreeing with the contention of the appellant, the bench noted in the order, “…rather than confining itself to ascertaining whether prima facie case has been made out on the basis of the contents of FIR, the High Court proceeded to examine the outcome of the trap proceedings, absence of personal recovery from Respondent No. 1 and result of the phenolphthalein test, and findings of a departmental enquiry against some of the accused, all of which are matters of evidence to be evaluated at the stage of trial.”

The bench added, “By undertaking such a detailed examination, the High Court has in effect conducted a mini-trial, which is fundamentally contrary to the settled principles governing the exercise of the quashing jurisdiction.”

The bench also noted that in the case, the circumstantial evidence, including the recorded telephonic conversations and the recovery of bribe amount from a person closely connected with the Respondent No. 1 (Rangayya), constitutes material that is required to be examined and evaluated during the course of the trial.

Similarly, whether the complaint was motivated or otherwise is itself a matter of evidence and trial. “The mere allegation of pre-existing hostility does not render the allegations in the FIR so inherently improbable or manifestly absurd as to justify quashing,” the bench said in the order.

The Supreme Court also opined that the departmental enquiry conducted against the co-accused, exonerating them, cannot operate as an exoneration of the principal accused in a criminal investigation.