Signing you in

There was a great sense of optimism last Saturday when Trump held a summit phone call with Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE, Bahrain, Egypt, and Turkey — and spoke separately with Israel — to announce that a US-Iran Memorandum of Understanding was close to being finalised. However, the MoU, which could be labelled the Islamabad Declaration, continues to hang fire, though the latest reports suggest it could be signed within days.

While the contours of the MoU are still to be made public, details have trickled in from both sides. Under the provisional framework, Iran will reopen the Strait of Hormuz to pre-war commercial shipping levels within 30 days of signing the MoU, though restrictions will remain in place for military vessels. In a reciprocal exchange, the US will gradually lift its naval blockade, temporarily suspend oil export sanctions, and pledge comprehensive sanctions relief alongside the unfreezing of Iranian assets upon a final agreement. On the nuclear file, Iran will formally reiterate its commitment to never pursue nuclear weapons. The opening round of permanent negotiations will focus on the duration of Tehran’s uranium enrichment freeze and the fate of its 60 per cent enriched uranium stockpile — specifically, whether to dilute the material domestically or export it to a third country like Russia or China. However, Iran’s concessions on the nuclear issue will be linked to US sanctions relief.

Notably, the MoU does not include any reference to Iran restricting its missile capabilities or its support for regional proxies. And while Iran is pushing to eventually manage the Strait of Hormuz in cooperation with Oman, the US is demanding that Iran permanently close its nuclear sites at Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan.

Trump’s announcement last week that an interim MoU with Iran is close to being finalised led to a rare public backlash from prominent congressional Republicans that it amounts to a premature capitulation that leaves Iran strategically intact. This reaction was expected, given that mainstream Republican criticism of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) has remained one of the most significant foreign policy battlegrounds of the past decade. Specifically, Republican lawmakers have long condemned the 2015 agreement as it completely excluded restrictions on Iran’s ballistic missile programme and its support for regional proxies, besides the $1.7 billion settlement of a pre-revolution military procurement dispute. In fact, Trump made dismantling the accord a centrepiece of his 2016 campaign, ultimately withdrawing the US from the JCPOA in May 2018.

To manage the backlash, Trump publicly instructed his negotiators not to rush the final text until they secure a great deal. Additionally, he framed the MoU as a vehicle to expand the Abraham Accords, declaring it mandatory for the Muslim nations involved in the Iran talks to join the Accords — notwithstanding the fact that none of these countries are in a position to alter their policies until a solution to the Palestinian issue is accepted. The US’s limited attacks on southern Iran last Monday and Thursday, along with its greenlighting of Israel’s latest major military operations in Lebanon, should also be viewed in this context. Iran’s retaliatory strike on a US military base in Kuwait was intercepted.

Iran is insistent that the war must end on all fronts, including in Lebanon. Facing fierce opposition from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu over linking the agreement to a cessation of hostilities in Lebanon, Washington is attempting to bridge the gap by proposing that the 60-day ceasefire extension apply to Lebanon, while explicitly preserving Israel’s right to act against immediate threats from Hezbollah.

In reality, however, Trump is in a weaker bargaining position with Iran than Barack Obama was in 2015. He is now in a worse position than at the commencement of the war, primarily due to the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. Having effectively altered the maritime status quo, Iran is now positioned to influence both the pace and the substantive content of the peace talks.

Nevertheless, Trump must secure nuclear concessions that go far beyond the original JCPOA parameters. Unlike the sunset clauses of the JCPOA — under which critical restrictions on Iran expired after 10 to 15 years — this baseline requires Iran to accept a complete enrichment moratorium and a subsequent permanent cap. At the same time, Washington faces a major impasse over maritime sovereignty, as Iran continues to insist on long-term control over maritime passage through the Strait of Hormuz. In the end, a diplomatic breakthrough is still achievable if both parties accept compromises and secure enough narrative leverage to satisfy their domestic bases.

The writer former Governor of India to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Vienna, former ambassador to Egypt and former Permanent representative to the Arab League